Abstract. This paper extends Plott's necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of majority rule equilibria to the case where there is a continuous distribution of voters. Plott's theorem extends in a natural way to this setting: It is shown that a point, x*, is a majority rule equilibrium if and only if, for every measurable cone originating at the origin, the measure of the voters whose gradients (at x*) lie in the cone is equal to the measure of the voters whose gradients lie in the negative cone.
1. Introduction. Plott's (1967) well-known necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium in majority rule spatial voting games show that an equilibrium (or Condorcet point) exists only under the most restrictive circumstances. Briefly, assuming that (1) individual utility functions are differentiable, (2) the number of voters is finite, and (3) at most one voter's ideal point is located at the presumed equilibrium, Plott establishes that a "local" equilibrium exists if and only if all voters (excluding any at the equilibrium) can be paired in such a way that the contract curve of each pair passes through the equilibrium. Equivalently, voters can be paired such that the utility gradients of voters in each pair point in exactly opposite directions. Sloss (197 3) extends this result to deal with nondifferentiable utility functions.
Here we focus on assumption (2) above and generalize Plott's analysis to continuous voter distributions. While empirical preference distributions are, of course, discrete, a substantial literature models them as continuous. For example, Downs (1957) and Tullock (1967) discuss, in very unformalized terms, the question of equilibria for continuous voter distributions. More recent literature formalizes some of these ideas, but assumes specific functional forms for individual utility, and generally gives only sufficient conditions for existence of equilibria (see Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook (1970) , and Riker and Ordeshook (1973, Chaps. 11-12) for reviews of this literature). These models assume individual preferences are a function of distance (not necessarily Euclidean) from some ideal point, and the basic results are that a strong type of symmetry in the distribution of ideal points is sufficient for the existence of equilibria. Only when all preferences are a function of Euclidean distance have necessary and sufficient conditions been found for the infinite voter model. The condition is the existence of a total median in the distribution of ideal points (Davis, Degroot, and Hinich (1972) DEFINITION 2.2. For any a, /3 f, the contract set C(a, 3), is the set C(a,/3) {x X[ for all y X, y > x ==), x >-t Y and y > t x ==), x > y}.
In the usual terminology, C(a, ) corresponds to the set of points that are Pareto optimal for a and/3. See e.g., McKelvey and Wendell (1976) . We now state a sufficient condition for a point to be a Condorcet point. THEOREM 1. A sufficient condition for a point x* X to be a Condorcet point is that there exists some measure preserving transformation T: 1 -f such that x* fq C(a, Ta).
Proof. Let x* and T satisfy the conditions of the theorem. We must show that, for all xsX, tz[x*>x]>-lz[x>,x*]. Let B={alx>x*} and let A=T(B)= for all x X. See, e.g., Mangasarian (1969) for properties of pseudoconcave functions. In particular, any pseudoconcave function is also strictly quasiconcave (Mangasarian, (1969, p. 143)). That is, for any x, y X, and 0 < A < 1,
Further, if all U are pseudoconcave, then for any x X, y ", it follows that sets of the form {a IV U (x). y > 0}, {a 17 U (x). y 0}, {a [ U (x). y, 0}, etc., are measur- We wish to show now that (3.10) is equivalent to (3.11) tz*(H )=/x*(H-) for all y.
Obviously, (3.11) implies (3.10), so we must only show that (3.10) implies (3.11 Y'. tx*(/-/.) <_-x*(n) N. Now, using (3.13) and (3.14), for any K 3; we have
From this, it follows that/x * (Hz,) > e can hold for at most finitely many i, as we wished to show. Thus, if vl, v2 ,'" is a sequence of vectors such that any n are linearly independent then/x*(Hv,) 0 and consequently, from (3.10)
Now, introduce coordinates so that y =(1, 0,..., 0). Let v (1, v12," , Vln), v2 (1, v22, v23, , v2n) ," be a sequence of vectors such that (i) limVg'/.+=0 for j=l, 2,...,n-1; (3.18) (ii) vi/. > 0 for all i, j;
(iii) any n of the vectors vi are linearly independent.
To satisfy condition (iii) vi must not be in any one of the 1Cn 1 planes spanned by n 1-tuples of previously selected vectors. Clearly there is no difficulty in constructing a sequence which satisfies (i), (ii) and this additional restriction.
The sets/-/v+, converge pointwise to H-U P, where P is the set of vectors which belong to Hy (i.e., have 0 first component) and whose first non-zero component is [1972] show that a necessary and sufficient condition for x* to be a Condorcet point is that x* be a total median of the distribution of the vectors x. Note that this follows from Theorem 2 and equation (4.3) by considering sets, A, which are half spaces of the form H-. Davis, Degroot and Hinich then proceed to give conditions on the distribution of the x which are sufficient for x* to be a total median. These conditions are that the distribution of x is symmetric about x* in the following sense" For every Borel symmetric" about some point--the presumed equilibrium. Here, weak symmetry means that for any cone, say A, the proportion of voters with ideal points in the cone x* + A equals the proportion with ideal points in the cone x*-A.
It is important to emphasize, nevertheless, the importance of Plott's third precondition and the corresponding condition of our theorem that the set of voters with ideal points at x* is of measure zero. It is straightforward to show, that if these conditions do not hold in their respective finite and continuous population cases, neither our theorem nor Plott's analysis establishes necessity. Suppose that Us is given by simple Euclidean distances. In Fig. 1 
